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COMMENTS
Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors'
Emergency Powers
In times of natural catastrophe or civil disorder, immediate and
decisive action by some component of state government is essential.
The legislative police power can of course be exercised to deal with
crises affecting the public health, safety, and welfare. In practice,
however, the ravages of nature and the exigencies of rioting, labor
strife, and civil rights emergencies usually necessitate prompt
governmental response. Since the executive is inherently better able
than the legislature to provide this immediate response, state chief
executives have frequently been given substantial discretionary
authority in the form of emergency powers to deal with anticipated
crises.1 Consequently, when public emergencies arise, the center of
governmental response is usually the governor's office.
The primary source of executive emergency power is the state
constitution, although statutes often codify the constitutional executive emergency authority and occasionally delegate additional legislative police powers to the governor. Most governors are authorized
to respond to public emergencies with a variety of extraordinary
emergency measures. This study of state constitutional and statutory
emergency power provisions has been undertaken in an attempt to
evaluate the sources and scope of governors' emergency powers, as
well as the limitations upon those powers. Its primary focus will be
upon the extreme breadth of executive emergency authority and, in
particular, upon the power to use military force during times of
public emergency.2

I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Grants of Authority
The prov1S1ons of state constitutions from which executive
emergency powers are derived display a marked uniformity. Every
1. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-341 to -346 (1956) (governor's civil defense
powers); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 39.408-.409 (1962) (governor's civil defense powers); MICH,
COMP. LAws § 10.31 (1948) (governor's emergency powers); ORE, REv. STAT, § 401.530
(1963) (governor's emergency powers).
2. The components of the state ,military forces are variously defined in the several
states; .the component most frequently utilized by governors in public emergencies is
the state "national guard"-the term used to identify the organized military force.
E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 361 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 21.01 (1957). Typically, the
"militia" is the unorganized body of individuals subject to state military service. E.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAws § 32.1 (1948); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7-103(d) (Supp. 1964). Also, the
statutes frequently authorize organization of a "state guard" when the state national
guard is called into active federal service. E.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7-401 (Supp, 1964);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1151 (Supp. 1963); WIS. STAT. ANN, § 21.025 (1957).
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state constitution confers the executive power upon a governor, or
designates the governor as the chief executive officer of the state.3
Every state constitution also designates the governor as commanderin-chief of the state military forces. 4 Furthermore, all constitutions
except those of Massachusetts and New Hampshire explicitly charge
the governor with the duty of faithful execution and enforcement
of state law. 5 In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, this duty can be
implied from the required oath of offi.ce.6 In addition, thirty-five
3. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113; ALASKA CONST. art. III. § 1; .ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 2;
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. 4, § 4; DEL. CONST.
art. III, § l; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. art. V, § 2-3001; HAWAII CONST. art.
IV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 6; IND. CONST. art. 5, '§ 1; IOWA
CoNST. art. IV, § l; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3; KY. CONST. § 69; LA. CoNST. art. V, § 2;
ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § l; Mo. CoNST. art. II, § l; MASS. CONST. ch. II, § I, art. I;
MICH. CoNST. art. V, § l; MISS. CoNST. art. 5, § 116; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § l; MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 5; NEB. CoNST. art. IV, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § I; N.H. CONST. pt. 2,
art. 41; N.J. CONST. art. V, § I, ~ l; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
N.C. CONST. art. III, § l; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 71; Omo CONST. art. III, § 5; OKLA.
CoNST. art. VI, § 2; ORE. CONST. art. V, § I; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; R.I. CONST. art.
VII, § l; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § l; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 1; TENN. CoNST. art. III,
§ l; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § l; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 5; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 3; VA.
CONST. art. V, § 69; WASH. CONST. art. III,§ 2;
VA. CONST. art. VII, § 5; WIS. CONST.
art. V, § l; WYO. CoNST. art 4, § l; cf• .ARiz. CONST. art. V, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. V,
§ 4.
.
4. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 131; ALAsKA CONST. art. III, § 19; .ARiz. CONST. art. V, § 3;
.ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 5; CoLO. CoNST. art. IV,§ 5; CoNN. CoNST.
art. 4, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; GA. CONST. art. V, § 2-3010;
HAWAII CoNST. art. IV, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 14; IND.
CONST. art. 5, § 12; IowA CoNST. art. IV, § 7; KAN. CONST. art. 8, § 4; KY. CONST. § 75;
LA. CONST. art. XVII,§ 2; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 7; MD. CoNST. art. II, § 8; MASS.
CoNST. art. of amend. LIV; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; MISS.
CONST. art. 5, § 119; Mo. CoNST. art. IV, § 6; MoNT. CoNST. art VII, § 6; NEB. CoNST.
art. IV, § 14; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 51; N.J. CONST. art. V, § I,
~ 12; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 8;
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 75; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 6; ORE.
CONST. art. V, § 9; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 3; s.c. CONST. art.
IV, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 7;
UTAH CONST. art. VII,§ 4; VT. CONST. ch. II,§ 20; VA. CONST. art. v, § 73; WASH. CONST.
art. III, § 8;
VA. CONST. art. VII, § 12; Wrs. CONST. art.
§ 4; WYO. CONST. art.
4, § 4, art. 17, § 5.
5. ALA. CoNST. art. V, § 120; ALAsKA CoNST. art. III, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 4;
ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 2; CONN. CONST.
art. IV, § 11; DEL. CoNST. art. III, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; GA. CONST. art.
V, § 2-3011; HAWAII CONST. art. IV, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. V,
§ 6; IND. CONST. art. 5, § 16; lowA CONST. art. IV, § 9; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3; KY.
CONST. § 81; LA. CONST. art. V, § 14; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 12; MD. CONST. art.
II, § 9; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 8; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 123;
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 6; NEV.
CONST. art. 5, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ~ 11; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. CONST.
art. IV, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 75; OHIO CONST. art. III,
§ 6; OKLA. CoNST. art. VI, § 8; ORE. CONST. art. V, § 10; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; R.I.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; s.c. CONST. art. IV, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 4; TENN. CONST.
art. III, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 10; UTAH CoNST. art. VII, § 5; VT. CoNST. ch.
II,§ 20; VA. CONST. art. V, § 73; WASH. CONST. art. III,§ 5; W. VA. CONST. art. VII,§ 5;
WIS. CONST. art. v, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. 4, § 4.
·
6. MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. I; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 84.

w.

w.

v,
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constitutions explicitly authorize the governor to call out the state
national guard to enforce the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasion.7 Of these thirty-five constitutions, only that of Arkansas,
which restricts exercise of the governor's emergency power to those
times when the legislature is not in session, contemplates legislative
control of the manner in which the guard is to act. 8 The slight
variations of language which occur in the various provisions
designating the purposes for which the guard may be called out
appear to be of little consequence.9 Authority for calling out the
guard "to enforce the laws" would seem to be sufficiently broad to
permit the use of the guard in any public disorder or natural disaster
attended by a crisis in local law enforcement. Of the fifteen state
constitutions which do not confer upon the governor explicit constitutional authority to call out the national guard, only one specifically
prohibits such actions by the governor; the Tennessee militia cannot
be called into service unless the legislature declares "by law, that the
public safety requires it."10 In each of the other fourteen states, the
governor's power to call out the national guard can be implied from
his constitutional powers as chief executive officer of the state and
commander-in-chief of the military forces, and from his constitutionally imposed obligation to enforce the laws. 11 The provisions
conferring these general powers serve, in each of the fourteen states,
as the bases for statutes explicitly authorizing the governor to call
out the national guard.12
7. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 131; ALASKA CONST, art. III, § 19; ARK. CONST. art. 11, § 4;
COLO. CONST. art. IV,§ 5; FLA. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; HAWAII CONST. art. IV, § 5; IDAJIO
CONST. art. IV, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 14; IND. CONST. art. 5, § 12; KAN. CONST. art.
8, § 4; LA. CoNST. art. XVII, § 2; MD. CONST. art. II, § 8; MASS. CONST, art. of amend.
LIV; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. 9, § 217;
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MoNT. CONST. art. VII, § 6; NEB. CoNST. art. IV, § 14; NEV,
CONST. art. 12, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 51; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.C. CONST. art.
XII, § 3; N.D. CoNST. art. III, § 75; Omo CoNST. art. IX, § 4; OKLA. CONST, art.
VI, § 6; ORE. CONST. art. V, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 3; S.D. CONST, art. IV, § 4:
TEX. CoNST. art. IV, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 4; VA. CONST. art. V, § 73; WASH.
CONST. art. X, § 2; W. VA. CoNST. art. VII,§ 12: WYo. CONST. art. 4, § 4; art. 17, § 5.
8. "The Governor shall, when the General Assembly is not in session, have power
to call out the volunteers or militia, or both, to execute the laws, repel invasion, repress
insurrection and preserve the public peace in such manner as may be authorized by
law." ARK. CoNST. art. 11, § 4.
9. Several states substitute other phrases for the phrase "to enforce the Jaws."
E.g., LA. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 51. Other states add "suppress
riots" or "preserve public peace" to the designated purposes. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 11,
§ 4; MISS, CONST. art. 9, § 217; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. XII, § 3;
S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
IO. TENN. CONST. art. Ill, § 5.
11. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
12. ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 26-172 (1956); CAL. MIL. 8: VET. CODE §§ 143, 146; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 27-16 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 171 (1953); GA. CODE ANN,
§ 86-106 (1963); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29.7 (Supp. 1964); KY. REY. STAT. §§ 37.240, 38.080
(1962); ME. REY. STAT. ANN. ch. 25, § 703 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:2-4 (Supp.
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B. Limitations on Authority
Although the constitutional and statutory provisions granting
executive emergency authority do not restrict the mode of exercise
of the military power after the state national guard has been ordered
into emergency service, several state constitutions contain other
provisions indicating that the state executive is not intended to have
unlimited military powers in times of public emergency. The constitutions of seven states provide that only those persons in the active
service of the militia can be punished under martial law.13 The
phrase "martial law" is indeterminate,14 however, and no cases have
been found which construe its meaning in these particular constitutional provisions. The provisions clearly indicate an intention not
to allow the displacement of normal civil processes by the summary
trial and punishment of civilians by military commissions;15 as a
practical matter, however, the ambiguity of these constitutional
provisions may minimize their effectiveness as limitations upon the
exercise of executive emergency authority.
A second type of restrictive provision, found in the constitutions
of nineteen states, declares that the op~ration of the laws is to be
suspended only by the legislature.16 On several occasions involving
public emergencies, governors have suspended the operation of the
civil laws and have substituted military enforcement of executive
orders. 17 The nineteen states which prohibit this practice have
recognized the danger that a governor may use the existence of a
public emergency as an excuse for imposing arbitrary restrictions
upon rights established under the civil laws. The universal adoption
of this constitutional prohibition would restrict to some degree the
1964); N.Y. MIL. LAW art. I, § 6; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 1-311 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 30·2·6 (1957); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 601 (1959); W1s'. STAT, ANN. § 21.11 (1957).
In Tennessee, despite the constitutional prohibition, see note 10 supra and accompanying text, a statute authorizes the governor to call out the national guard in times
of public emergency. TENN. ConE ANN. § 7-106 (Supp. 1964). Compliance with the constitution is sought by insertion of a proviso that the "militia" cannot be called out
except by legislative command, ibid., with "militia" defined in the statute to exclude
the state national guard. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-103(d) (Supp. 1964).

13. ME. CONST. art. I, § 14; Mn. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 32; MASS.
CONST., Declaration of Rights art. XX.VIII; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 34; s.c. CONST. art. I,
§ 27; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 25; VT. CoNST. ch. I, art. 17. See also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 18;
w. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 12.
·
14. See generally FAIRMAN, THE LAw OF MARTIAL RULE 19-49 (2d ed. 1943); WmNER,
A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 6-15 (1940).
15. See FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 96-97.
16. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 21; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 12; DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 10;
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 26; KY. CONST., Bill of Rights § 15;
ME. CONST. art. I, § 13; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 9; MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. XX; N.H. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 29; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 9; OHIO
CONST, art. I, § 18; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 22; PA. CONST. art. I, § 12; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; S.D. CONST, art. VI, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 28; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 15; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
17. See RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAw FAILS 85-113 (1939).
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exercise of executive emergency authority, but it could not prevent
all arbitrary and unreasonable emergency measures. For example,
a court construing the prohibition might accept the dubious theory
propounded by the West Virginia Supreme Court that even constitutional guarantees are subject to suspension by executive order when
the governor deems the danger to the state sufficiently great. 18 Also,
since the prohibition applies only to the total suspension of the
operation of the civil laws, it would not seem to prohibit arbitrary
emergency measures which supplement but do not suspend the
operation of the civil laws.
A third type of constitutional provision could theoretically serve
as an effective limitation upon emergency use of military power by
the executive. Every state constitution except that of New York
declares that military power shall be subordinate to civil power. 10
In practice, however, these provisions have proved largely ineffective
as limitations upon executive use of military force during public
emergencies. A few courts did hold that state national guard forces
could only assist civil officers in the enforcement of civil law, that
troops so employed were subject to all the commands and prohibitions of civil law, and that the military forces could not cope with
public emergencies by means prohibited to civil authorities. 20 However, subsequent statutes in the states whose courts espoused these
restrictive views have granted substantially greater discretionary
authority to military forces engaged in public emergency service.21
18. State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 523, 77 S.E. 243, 245 (1912).
19. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 27; ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 20; Aruz. CONST. art. II, § 20;
.ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 27; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 22; CONN,
CONST. art. 1, § 18; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights § 21;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-119; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST, art. I, § 12; ILL.
CONST. art. II, § 15; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 33; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 14; KAN. CONST., Bill
of Rights § 4; KY. CONST. § 22; LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ME. CONST. art. I, § 17; MD.
CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 30; MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. XVII;
MICH. Cc>NST. art. I, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 14; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 9; Mo, CONST,
art. I, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 17; NEV, CONST. art. 1,
§ 11; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26; N.J. CONST. art. I, ,r 15; N.M. CONST, art, II, § 9;
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 14; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 18;
s.c. CONST. art. I, § 26; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 16; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 24; Tm.:. CONST,
art. I, § 24; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 18; w. VA. CONST. art. III, § 12; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 20;
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
Provisions of this type appeared in the earliest of state constitutions. Both the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared
that the military power should be held in strict subordination to, and be governed
by, the civil authority. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 104, 109 (Commager 5th
ed. 1949). The desire to subordinate military power is also expressed in the Declaration
of Independence, which recites, as one reason for severance, that the king "·has affected
to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power." Id. at 101.
20. See Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass.
121 (1855); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924).
21. See KY. REv. STAT. § 38.030 (1962); MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 33, §§ 40-43 (1961); M1cu,
COMP. LAws §§ 32.40-.41 (1948).
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Although these statutes do not overrule the prior judicial constructions of the constitutional provisions, the constitutionality of the
statutes would probably be upheld today under any one of a number
of theories. For instance, in most jurisdictions the governor's broad
power to use the national guard is not limited to merely assisting
civil authorities by methods permissible under civil law. Instead,
most governors have authority to order the guard to use whatever
measures of force are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.22
Other theories which would support the constitutionality of the
statutes are based upon the doctrine that a governor's invocation of
emergency military authority creates a state of qualified martial
law.23 The characteristics of qualified martial law were set forth in
an opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the
validity of an order directing the state national guard to put an end
to violence during a labor dispute:
Order 39 was . . . a declaration of qualified martial law.
Qualified in that it was put in force only as to the preservation
of the public peace and order, not for the ascertainment or
vindication of private rights, or the other ordinary functions of
government. For these the courts and other agencies of the law
were still open and no exigency required interference with
their functions. But within its necessary field, and for the accomplishment of its intended purpose it was martial law with
all its powers: The government has and must have this power
or perish.24
.
Courts upholding broad executive military authority under qualified
martial law have found several ways to minimize the impact of the
constitutional subordination of the military to the civil power. Some
courts have found the necessary subordination in the mere fact that
the national guard is subject to the direction and control of the
22. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.
Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934); In re
Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899);
State ex rel, Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933); Commonwealth ex rel.
Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903); In re Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77
S.E. 1029 (1913); State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
23. See generally FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 80-94; WIENER, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 11-15. Commentators have written much on the nature of qualified martial
law, the contrast between absolute and qualified martial law, and the validity of
acts of national guard forces during a state of qualified martial law. E.g., FAIRMAN,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 28-49, 80-124; WIENER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 6-42, 62-102;
Ballentine, Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal, 14 MICH. L. R.Ev. (pts.
1 &: 2) 102, 197 (1915); Ballentine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority,
24 YALE L.J. 189 (1914); Ballentine, Martial Law, 12 CoLUM. L. REv. 529 (1912);
Isscks, The Executive and His Use of the Militia, 16 ORE. L. R.Ev. 301 (1937); Comment,
1938 WIS. L. R.Ev. 314; Note, 31 IND. L.J. 456 (1956).
24. Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 170-71, 55 Atl.
952, 954 (1903).
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governor, who is the chief civil officer of the state.2 G Other courts
have based their conclusion on the theory that the paramount importance of the defense of the 'state requires that the constitutional
subordination of the military to the civil power yield when the threat
to the state is sufficiently great. 26 Only a small minority of courts
have held that the broad executive military powers characteristic of
qualified martial law are in conflict with the constitutional subordination of the military to the civil power.27
C. Summary
Constitutional limitations upon the role of military power in
state government have not led to the imposition of restrictive criteria
governing the use of executives' constitutional emergency powers.
The absence of effective constitutional limitations has meant that in
practice the exercise of the broad emergency powers is tempered
primarily by executive self-restraint. Nevertheless, statutory provisions and due process limitations do impose some degree of control
upon the exercise of executive emergency authority.
II.

STATE STATUTES

The statutes pertaining to governors' emergency powers are of
two basic types: those which codify constitutional executive
emergency authority and those which delegate to the executive additional authority based on the legislative police powers. No detailed
survey of the statutes of all fifty states will be made here; instead,
attention will be focused on several common patterns.
Statutes cannot, of course, directly restrict the scope of constitutionally granted executive emergency authority. In theory, however,
the legislature could significantly guide the executive's use of his
constitutional emergency power by articulating the conditions which
call for the exercise of that power and suggesting the procedures
and degrees of force appropriate to particular emergency conditions.
Statutes delegating legislative police powers can restrict the scope of
the power granted and delimit the conditions under which it is to
be employed.
A. Executive Military Authority
In most states, legislation governing military affairs includes a
codification of the governor's constitutional authority to call out the
25. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 159, 85 Pac. 190, 193 (1905); Franks v. Smith, 142
Ky. 232, 242, 134 S.W. 484, 488 (1911); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 462, 143 Pac,
947, 949-50 (1914); see FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 97-98.
26. See, e.g., In re :Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899); State ex rel. Roberts
v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933); Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall,
206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903).
27. Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121 (1855); :Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200
N.W. 278 (1924); cf. Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911).
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national guard £or public emergency service. Whereas the constitutions state general purposes £or which military force may be used,28
the statutes enumerate in somewhat greater detail the emergency
conditions which permit the governor to call out the national
guard.29 Such a statutory classification of emergency conditions can
be a useful guide to an executive faced with the decision whether
to invoke his emergency powers in a given situation. Unfortunately,
however, most statutes defining executive military authority do not
suggest what procedures and degrees of force are appropriate to
particular emergency conditions. The statutes generally reflect the
view that the severity of response to public emergencies is a matter
to be left solely to the governor's discretion.
In many states, the legislation fails to indicate what relationship
exists between the national guard on emergency duty and the local
civil authorities.ao In several states, however, some guidance is
provided by statutes which authorize civil authorities to designate
the objectives to be attained, while national guard officers select the
means to achieve those ends.a1
Statutes frequently permit the governor to declare a state of
insurrection82 or of martial law.as The two declarations appear to
have the same significance, differing only in their terminology. Of
the statutes which grant such authority, only two include a definition
of martial law.84 In the absence of definitions and judicial interpre28. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., CAL. MIL. &: VET. CODE .ANN. § 146; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.83
(1963); MICH. COMP. LAws § 32.40 (1948); N.Y. MIL. LAW .ANN. art. I, § 6; OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 5923.21-.22 (Baldwin 1964); S.C. CODE § 44-114 (1962); Wrs. STAT• .ANN.
§ 21.11 (1957). A typical statute provides:
In event of war, insurrection, rebellion, invasion, tumult, riot, mob or body
of men acting together by force with intent to commit a felony or to offer violence
to persons or property, or by force and violence to break and resist the laws of
this state, or the United States, or in case of the imminent danger of the occur•
rence of any of said events, or whenever responsible civil authorities shall, for
any reason, fail to preserve law and order, or protect life or property, or the
governor believes that such failure is imminent, or in the event of public disaster,
the governor shall have power to order the organized militia • . . [into active
service].
WASH. REV. CODE§ 38.08.040 (1958).
30. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 26-172 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 27-16
(1958); N.Y. MIL. LAW ANN. art. I, § 6; N.D. CODE .ANN. § 37-01-04 (1960); VA. CODE
.ANN. § 44-75 (Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT• .ANN. § 21.11 (1957).
31. E.g., !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.85 (1963); MASS. ANN. LAWS tit. V, § 43 (1961);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 32.41 (1948); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5923.23 (1954); cf. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 606 (1959).
32. E.g., CAL. MIL. &: VET. CoDE ANN. § 143; N.D. CooE .ANN. § 37-01-08 (1960);
S.C. CODE § 44-122 (Supp. 1964).
,
33. E.g., N.Y. MIL. LAw ANN. art. I, § 6; ORE. REV. STAT. § 399.065 (1963); R.I.
GEN. LAws .ANN. § 30-2-5 (1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-1-8 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 38.08.030 (1958); W. VA. CODE ch. 15, § 1195 (1961).
34. The Alaska and Washington statutes define a state of complete martial law,
which permits the governor to supersede the civil authority by the military forces for
a limited time, and a state of limited martial law, which entails only a partial subordi-
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tations, the extent of the military authority which may be exercised
pursuant to a declaration of martial law or insurrection is uncertain.
The terms of the provisions and the context in which they are found
often suggest that when a declaration is made the governor may
employ whatever measures of force are necessary to restore order.M
The declarations under this type of statute would therefore appear to
carry with them the attributes of qualified martial law.36
B. Executive Civil Defense Authority
Civil defense statutes enacted in many states confer broad
emergency authority upon the governor.37 The legislation supplements, but does not restrict, other constitutional and statutory
executive military powers. 38 Civil defense legislation does, however,
frequently impose limitations upon the exercise of the emergency
powers which it grants. These statutes often provide that the
emergency powers do not arise until a civil defense emergency is
proclaimed. 39 Many statutes limit the definition of a "civil defense
emergency" to emergencies created by war, enemy attack or threats
thereof, or natural disaster; 40 others define "civil defense emergency"
in terms sufficiently broad to include riots and other instances of civil
disorder. 41 The exercise of the governor's powers is sometimes
limited by the authority of a civil defense advisory council,42 but
most civil defense legislation gives the governor wide discretion in
selecting the appropriate response to a civil defense emergency.48
nation of the civil to the military. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 26.05.090 (1962); WASH. REV,
CODE § 38.08.030 (1958).
35. The California statute, for example, authorizes the governor to declare a
state of insurrection and then order the national guard into active service under the
command of officers he selects. This power is granted in addition to ·his power to
call out the national guard for public emergency service, and resistance to military
authority during a state of insurrection is a crime. CAL. MIL. &: VET. CoDE ANN,
§§ 143, 145, 146.
36. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-342 (1956); CONN, GEN, STAT, ANN,
§§ 28-9, -11 (1960); N.D. CoDE ANN. § 37-17-06 (Supp. 1965); VT, STAT, ANN, tit. 20,
§ 9 (Supp. 1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.01(4), .02(1) (Supp. 1965).
38. See 25 Ore. Att'y Gen. Rep. 114 (1952).
39. See statutes cited note 37 supra.
40. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-342 (1956); CONN, GEN. STAT, ANN, § 28·9
(1960); N.D. CODE ANN. §§ 37-17-06, -16 (Supp. 1965); Rl. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 30-15-14,
-15 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-142.2 (1953).
41. CAL. MIL. &: VET. CODE ANN. § 1505; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 22.02 (Supp. 1965),
The California code excludes labor strife from the definition of emergency. CAL,
MIL. &: VET. CODE ANN. § 1505.
42, E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 11 (1959). Civil defense advisory councils, created
in many states, constitute forums which may render useful guidance to governors
during emergencies. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODE § 77-1305 (1956); N.C. GEN, STAT. § 166·
4 (1964); VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 4 (1959).
43. See statutes cited note 37 supra.
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C. Special Executive Emergency Authority
The governors of Michigan, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina are ~anted special statutory emergency powers supplementary to
their military and civil defense powers.44 The statutes in those states
permit the governors to proclaim a state of emergency and promulgate regulations which have the force of law during the public
emergency.45 The Michigan statute specifically permits these regulations to apply to the use of both public and private property, and to
the conduct of private citizens.46 In contrast, the only regulations
specifically authorized by the statutes of Florida and Georgia are
those affecting only public property; 47 however, the governors of
those states, as well as of South Carolina, have the power to employ
whatever measures of force they deem necessary in public emergencies. 48 Such measures could, no doubt, affect private as well as
public property, and the conduct of private citizens. The statutes,
which impose no restrictions on the measures of force which the
governors may apply and leave the determination of the restrictive
measures solely in the governor's discretion, 49 clearly reflect a legislative intent to vest extremely broad public emergency powers in
the governors.60 Although the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina
statutes designate numerous means for enforcing the restrictive
measures, there is no requirement that the governors use less drastic
civil enforcement means before resorting to military force. 61
Two conclusions can be drawn concerning state constitutional
and statutory executive emergency powers. First, most governors
have extremely broad authority to cope with problems of natural
disaster and civil disorder. Second, in some states emergency powers
may be exercised only during certain kinds of crises, but the constitutions and statutes which grant the powers do not restrict the mode
of their exercise.
44. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, §§ 14.021-.022 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-211 to -217
(1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 10.31-.33 (1948); S.C. CODE §§ 1-128 to -130.3 (1962).
45, FLA. STAT• .ANN. tit. IV, § 14.021(1) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-213 (1957);
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 10.31, .33 (1948); see S.C. CoDE §§ 1-129 to -130 (1962).
46. MICH. COMP, LAws § 10.31 (1948).
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, § 14.021(1) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-213 (1957).
48. "(I) The governor is hereby authorized and empowered to take such measures
and to do all and every act and thing which he may deem necessary ••• to order
and direct any individual person, corporation, association or group of persons to
do any act • • • or • • • to refrain from doing any act • • • .'' FLA. STAT. .ANN.
tit. IV, § 14.022 (1961). See GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 40-211, -212 (1957); S.C. CODE § 1-130
(1962).
49. All of the statutes permit the governor to employ whatever measures he deems
necessary. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, § 14.022 (1961); GA. CoDE ANN. § 40.211 (1957);
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 10.31 (1948); S.C. CoDE § 1-128 (1962).
50. See FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, § 14.021(4) (1961); MICH. COMP. LAws § 10.32 (1948);
s.c. CODE § 1-130.3 (1962); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-216 (1957).
51. See FLA. STAT• .ANN. tit. IV, § 14.022 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 40.216 (1957);
S.C. CODE § 1-130.1 (1962).
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THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXERCISE OF
EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS

A. Judicial Review

Broad emergency powers of unrestricted application are easily
abused; on numerous occasions the existence of a public emergency
has resulted in the denial of private rights and individual liberties. 52
At the beginning of this century, attempts were made to subject the
use of executive emergency powers to judicial control.Gs Effective
judicial controls were not imposed, however, because of the widespread judicial acceptance of doctrines of qualified martial law and
because of the discretionary nature of the powers. Because governors'
declarations of emergencies under civil defense and emergency power
statutes are discretionary acts not subject to judicial injunction or
invalidation,i;,1 and because of the refusal of courts to review governors' declarations of martial law, proclamations of insurrection,
3:nd calls for national guard troops, 55 attention has been shifted to
the judicial review of particular acts ordered by executives during
public emergencies. In Moyer v. Peabody, 56 the plaintiff, a labor
leader, had been arrested and detained without trial by state military
forces throughout the course of a violent labor dispute in a Colorado
mining region. After his release he brought a suit for damages
against the governor, alleging that he had been deprived of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
action, suggesting in sweeping terms that the governor was the sole
judge not only of the necessity for proclaiming a state of insurrection,
but also of the appropriateness of the specific measures to be taken
to restore order.57
·
Moyer v. Peabody undoubtedly inspired the rash of subsequent
52. See RANKIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 65-113.
53. E.g., In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); Commonwealth ex rel,
Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va,
759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914).
54. See statutes cited notes 37, 45 supra.
55. E.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F, Supp.
355 (S.D. Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 867-68 (D. Minn,
1934); Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P .2d 582 (1933). To a great

extent, these refusals to review governors' orders were occasioned by interpretations
of 'the United States Supreme Court's decision in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. '78
(1909), discussed in text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
,
56. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
57. "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that
they are needed in• order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge
and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office •••• When it comes
to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary
rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment."
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909). Cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I,
45 (1848).
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state-court refusals to review the propriety of measures used in good
faith by governors to cope with public emergencies.58 Neither state
nor federal due process requirements were thought to impose any
significant limits upon the exercise of executive emergency authority59 until the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Sterling v. Constantin 60 in 1932. In that ~ase, the Supreme Court
stated that although the governor's proclamation of martial law is
conclusive and permits him a wide range of discretion to deal with
public emergencies,
it does not follow ... that every sort of action the Governor may
take, no matter how unjustified by the exigency or sub.versive
of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise
available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat .••.
What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and
whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case,
are judicial questions.61
The propriety of judicial review of executive emergency measures,
once established in federal courts by the Sterling decision, soon became recognized in state courts as well. 62 Nevertheless, some courts
today might still refuse to review emergency acts explicitly authorized
by statute.63
B. The Standard of Due Process
When executive emergency authority is invoked, the citizens
affected may complain in court that the emergency measures ordered
by the governor deprive them of their personal or property rights
without due process of law. Ordinarily, courts find compliance with
due process if the restriction complained of is reasonably necessitated
by the public emergency and sufficiently related to the object of
securing peace and order.64 Whether there has been compliance with
58. E.g., State ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933); State ex rel.
Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
59. See In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57
Pac. 706 (1899); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914). But see Herlihy
v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164 (1916); Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454,
143 Pac. 947 (1914).
60. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
61. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932).
62. E.g., Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P .2d 582 (1933);
Hearon v. Caius, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935).
63. "It seems to be well established in this State that the courts have no jurisdiction to review any action performed by a governor under the power conferred upon
him either by the Constitution or legislative enactment. Mandamus will not lie to
compel action on his part, nor will an injunction be issued to restrain such action."
Born v. Dillman, 264 Mich. 440,444,250 N.W. 282, 283-84 (1933).
64. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Wilson &: Co. v. Freeman, 179
F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D.
Minn. 1936); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile
Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934).
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due process requirements is most easily ascertained when only a
single emergency measure has been taken. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that seizure of the plaintiff's oil wells
was not a reasonably necessary measure, because there was no showing that the plaintiff had violated production quotas set by law.Oil
However, the standard of due process becomes more difficult to apply
when multiple restrictions are imposed and attacked. Even if all of
the restrictions relate directly to securing peace and order, the court
faces a formidable task in determining the reasonable necessity for
a. particular measure. It must assess not only the need for the
particular restriction but also the efficacy of the restrictions which
would remain if the challenged one were invalidated.
When a court finds an emergency measure unduly restrictive, and
further determines that the other measures in force are sufficient to
deal with the emergency, it faces the additional problem of determining the scope of its decree. The court might enjoin application
• of the restriction to a single complainant, or it might order relief
from the measure in somewhat broader form. Limiting the decree so
as to benefit only the single complainant preserves the viability of
the emergency restriction for appropriate later applications, but
requires that all other affected individuals seek the desired relief in
time-consuming and expensive litigation. A broader judicial decree
could protect all adversely affected individuals, but might also prevent a necessary application of the measure in a subsequent situation
arising out of the same emergency.
C. Judicial Determinations of Due Process
The due process clause has occasionally been used to challenge
the deprivation of personal liberty and property during times of
public emergency. The two leading United States Supreme Court
decisions involving personal liberty and property rights are, respectively, Moyer v. Peabody and Sterling v. Constantin. As has already
been mentioned,66 in Moyer v. Peabody the Supreme Court held that
the detention of a labor leader during the course of a labor dispute
did not deprive him of liberty without due process of law, even
though he was not charged with any crime during or after the period
of detention. Subsequently, numerous state courts upheld the use
of similar detentions by the military, and even sanctioned trial of
civilians by military commissions.67 However, military trials of
civilians may be a thing of the past, except under actual conditions
65. Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P.2d 582 (1933).
66. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
67. E.g., United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (D. Neb, 1922);
United States ex rel. McMaster v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S.D. Tex. 1920); In re Jones,
71 W. Va. 567, 77 S:E. 1029 (1913).
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of war. The cases upholding such trials.have been severely criticized,68
and the United States Constitution has been construed to prohibit
both Congress and the President from authorizing military trial of
civilians.69 Furthermore, seven state constitutions preclude punishment of civilians by martial law.70 Military detention of civilians is
also of dubious validity today, except, perhaps, when the detention
is for a short period of time and is justified by the impracticality
of immediately transferring the individual to the civil authorities.
Another use of military detention has been to quarantine an individual guilty of no crime but whose mere presence in the vicinity
was deemed likely to incite further disorder. 71 The expanding scope
of fourteenth amendment due process, as demonstrated in Sterling v.
Constantin, strongly suggests that state executives no longer have
the unrestricted discretion to order military detention of civilians.72
Restrictions upon the exercise of property rights frequently accompany the abridgment of personal liberty during public emergencies.78 After Sterling v. Constantin established the principle that
the denial of property rights by executive emergency measures may
be deemed a violation of due process, several cases have found certain
emergency restrictions on property rights violative of due process.74
Three Minnesota cases involving the forced closing of business
operations during labor disputes illustrate the application of the
standard of due process to emergency restrictions on property rights.
In Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson,75 disputes between employers
and truck drivers had led to a strike and to violent prevention of
truck movements. Since the civil authorities were unable to control
the violence, the governor declared martial law and ordered the
militia to enforce regulations promulgated to restore order. One of
the emergency measures decreed by the governor and upheld by the
federal district court was an order prohibiting the complainant
68. FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 167-71. See also ANTHONY, HAWAII UNDER
(1955).
69. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See generally

ARMY RULE

Bishop, Court Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids-Retired Regulars,
Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1964).
70. See constitutions cited note 13 supra.
71. See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp.
355 (S.D. Ind. 1935).
72 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
73. For example, during the steel strike -of- 1937 th~- governors of Ohio• and
Pennsylvania ordered certain steel mills closed, see RANKIN, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 165-72; during a violent labor dispute in 1955 in New Castle, Indiana, the use of
property and the exercise of personal rights were both restricted. See 31 IND. L.J.
456 (1956).
74. Wilson &: Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Strutwear Knitting
Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936); Russell Petroleum Co v. Walker, 162
Okla. 216, 19 P .2d 582 (1933); cf. Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164
(1916).
75. 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934).
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employer from operating his trucks. A crucial factor in the determination that the measure was reasonable was that the acts of
violence and destruction involved were not focused at one particular
· location but were directed at mobile personal property; because
strikers could interfere with the-trucks anywhere along their routes,
law enforcement officers could not effectively prevent the unlawful
ac_ts except by stopping the traffic altogether.
In two subsequent Minnesota federal district court cases, Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson16 and Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 71 Powers
Mercantile was distinguished on its facts. In both Strutwear and
Wilson, mob violence flared when employers attempted to continue
business operations during strikes at their factories. Local authorities,
unable to quell the disturbances, requested aid from the governor,
and on each occasion the governor ordered out the national guard,
whose commanding officer ordered the factories closed. In both
instances, the employers successfully sought injunctions prohibiting
further interference with their constitutional right to use their property. In Strutwear the court stated that interference with the employer's right to use his plant was unnecessary and unjustified
because other means of preventing the violence had not been
exhausted. 78 In Wilson the court stated:
[WJe cannot subscribe to the principle or doctrine that a Governor of a state may bow to the demands of a law-violating mob
that a plant under strike shall be closed when neither the local
nor State authorities have used all the means available to them
to suppress the mob by invoking enforcement of the laws of the
State enacted to be enforced under such circumstances.... [lJt ·
would be a shocking reflection on the stability of our State
Government if the State could not quell the mob action in
Freeborn County without declaring martial law and decreeing
the deprivation of constitutional rights of those who are the
victims of the lawlessness.79
D. The Essex Wire Corporation Dispute
The difficulty of determining the necessity for emergency restrictions is well illustrated by recent events at Hillsdale, Michigan. The
International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers began a strike at the Hillsdale plant of the Essex Wire Corporation in
February 1964. From its inception, the strike was attended by destruction of company property and harassment of supervisory and
other non-union personnel who were attempting to maintain production. A temporary restraining order prohibiting the IUE from
76.
77.
78.
79.

13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936).
179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959).
Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384, 390-91 (D. Minn. 1936).
Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp.'520, 527-28 (D. Minn. 1959).

December 1965]

Governors' .Emergency Powers

305

engaging in acts of violence and interfering with entrance to and exit
from the plant was issued. by the county judge, who later revoked
the order and disqualified himself.80 In response to demands from its
insurers, Essex hired armed guards to protect its property and
workers. 81 Local courts and other civil authorities continued to
function normally, but Essex complained that neither local nor
state authorities took positive action to halt the strikers' acts of
violence.82
On two successive days state and local police were forced to spend
several hours dispersing mobs which surrounded the county jail
after police detained several participants in picket line fracases. 83
Hillsdale authorities then requested assistance from the governor,
who quickly proclaimed a 'state of public emergency.84 Pursuant to
the Michigan emergency powers statute,85 the governor promulgated
regulations, violation of which was a misdemeanor.86 The emergency
proclamation directed the Commissioner of the State Police to prohibit (I) the possession or carrying of dangerous weapons within the
city except by law enforcement officials and the national guard; (2)
unlawful traffic within the city; (3) movement within the areas surrounding the Essex plant and the city power plant except by those
with lawful business to conduct; (4) occupation or use of the Essex
plant; and (5) picketing, demonstrations, and assemblies at public
places in Hillsdale.87
The governor also ordered national guard troops into Hillsdale
to assist the Commissioner of the State Police in enforcing the regulations. 88 With the arrival of the first of approximately one thousand
armed and uniformed Michigan National Guardsmen, the violence
ended, the picketers dispersed, and the plant was closed. Shortly
thereafter, the governor amended the prior regulations, allowing the
plant to reopen and permitting peaceful picketing by no more than
five persons.89 The amendment also imposed a curfew on all public
streets within the county and extended the bans on dangerous
weapons and unlawful traffic to the entire county.9 ° Four days later
80. Detroit News, March 2, 1964, p. 11-B, col. 6; id., March 4, 1964, p. 6-A, col. 3.
81. Id., March 11, 1964, p. 12-A, col. 1.
82. Essex Wire Corp., 102 Crucial Days 10-18 (1964). Copy on file, Michigan Law
Review office.
83. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1964, p. 28, col. 2; id., May 29, 1964, p. 15, cols. 3, 4.
84. Proclamation by George Romney, Governor of the State of Michigan, May 28,
1964. Copy on file, Michigan Law Review office. Other unpublished proclamations
and orders cited infra are also on file at the Michigan Law Review office.
85. MICH. COMP. LAws § 10.31 (1948).
86. Exec. Order No. 1964-2, May 28, 1964.
87. Ibid.
88. Exec. Order No. 1964-2A, May 28, 1964.
89. Exec. Order No. 1964-3, June 2, 1964.
90. Ibid.
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these restrictions were withdrawn. 91 Following settlement of the
strike,. the state of emergency was declared ended, all emergency
regulations were rescinded, and the troops were withdrawn from
Hillsdale. 92
It is arguable that none of the restrictions imposed by the governor's emergency regulations were reasonably necessitated by the
circumstances in Hillsdale. The only support for this view, however,
is the retrospective observation that the stationing of a thousand
national guardsmen in Hillsdale might have been sufficient in itself
to control the disorder. Moreover, a court reviewing the necessity
for emergency measures would have to recognize two important
factors. First, at the time the measures were promulgated the governor had no assurance that national guard aid to the civil authorities
would end the crisis without further violence. Second, all of the
restrictive measures imposed were specifically authorized by statute. 08
It would not have been difficult for a reviewing court to find
sufficient disorder in Hillsdale to justify resort to some emergency
measures. Nevertheless, it would have been difficult to hold that all
the restrictions imposed were necessary during the entire period
they were in effect.
Particularly questionable was the governor's order closing the
Essex factory. 94 Essex was engaged in lawful business activity on its
property. The violence and harassment on the part of the strikers
appears to have been directed at forcing Essex to end its lawful but
unpopular manufacturing practices. In determining whether closing
the plant was reasonably necessary, a reviewing court could properly
have given weight to the fact that the emergency measures did not
first attempt to restrict the destructive activities of the strikers before
depriving Essex of the right to make a lawful use of its property.
According to the Strutwear and Wilson decisions, the closing of the
plant deprived Essex of its property without due process, since the
governor did not exhaust all available means for controlling unlawful conduct before ordering the factory closed.

JV.

CONCLUSIONS

Constitutions and ·statutes confer upon governors extremely
broad executive emergency authority. The mode of exercising that
emergency authority is rarely subjected to effective limitation by
constitutional, statutory, or judicial power. The fourteenth amendment and state constitutional guarantees of due process may limit the
91. Exec. Order No. 1964-3, as amended, June 6, 1964.
92. Proclamation by George Romney, Governor of the State of Michigan, June
11, 1964.
'
93. MICH. COMP. LAws § 10.31 (1948).
94. Exec. Order No. 1964-2, as amended, May 28, 1964.
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exercise of emergency powers, but the case-by-case determination of
the propriety of emergency measures is likely to cause irrevocable
denial of individual rights in many cases. The need for broad executive emergency authority to cope with crises does not preclude statutory specification of the procedures to be followed in exercising
emergency powers. Carefully drafted emergency power legislation,
permitting the exercise of only that degree of authority which the
circumstances require and directing that the lesser measures of
force be employed initially, would help to protect against needless
encroachment upon individual constitutional rights.

F. David Trickey

